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Abstract—Computing k-nearest-neighbor graphs constitutes a
fundamental operation in a variety of data-mining applications.
As a prominent example, user-based collaborative-filtering pro-
vides recommendations by identifying the items appreciated by
the closest neighbors of a target user. As this kind of applications
evolve, they will require KNN algorithms to operate on more and
more sensitive data. This has prompted researchers to propose
decentralized peer-to-peer KNN solutions that avoid concentrating
all information in the hands of one central organization. Un-
fortunately, such decentralized solutions remain vulnerable to
malicious peers that attempt to collect and exploit information
on participating users.
In this paper, we seek to overcome this limitation by proposing
H&S (Hide & Share), a novel landmark-based similarity mecha-
nism for decentralized KNN computation. Landmarks allow users
(and the associated peers) to estimate how close they lay to one
another without disclosing their individual profiles.
We evaluate H&S in the context of a user-based collaborative-
filtering recommender with publicly available traces from existing
recommendation systems. We show that although landmark-
based similarity does disturb similarity values (to ensure privacy),
the quality of the recommendations is not as significantly ham-
pered. We also show that the mere fact of disturbing similarity
values turns out to be an asset because it prevents a malicious
user from performing a profile reconstruction attack against other
users, thus reinforcing users’ privacy. Finally, we provide a formal
privacy guarantee by computing an upper bound on the amount
of information revealed by H&S about a user’s profile.
Keywords—Data privacy, Nearest neighbor searches, Peer-to-
peer computing, Recommender systems
I. INTRODUCTION
K-Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) algorithms provide a funda-
mental tool to mine and explore large amounts of data. In
particular, they lie at the core of memory-based collaborative
filtering (CF), a common technique for providing recommen-
dation to users [1]. The use of KNN for memory-based CF has
been particularly fruitful and has led to the recent emergence
of peer-to-peer (P2P) recommenders based on highly decen-
tralized KNN algorithms [2], [3].
Peer-to-peer KNN recommenders are particularly scalable,
and have therefore been proposed as a way to address the
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Fig. 1. Recommendation quality with different levels of randomization of user
profiles. This quality is not significantly hampered by levels of randomization
of up to 75%.
scalability issues that characterize centralized recommenders.
Distributing KNN computation across peers makes it possible
to compute recommendation without requiring huge servers or
data centers.
Peer-to-peer KNN recommenders also avoid the danger of
prominent players acting as “Big Brothers”. Deconcentrating
data across peers makes it more difficult for content providers
to access and possibly reuse the personal data for purposes
other than recommendation. Yet, the peer-to-peer model in-
troduces new privacy threats that do not come from a Big
Brother but from the peers themselves. The decentralized KNN
algorithms at the basis of most peer-to-peer recommenders [2],
[3] require peers to exchange their interest profiles with other
peers in order to compute similarity values. In doing so,
they do not simply risk to share sensitive information; they
systematically require users to share personal data with random
other users. This makes it very easy for an attacker to learn
about the interests of a large number of victims.
To address this challenge, we propose Hide & Share
(H&S), a novel similarity mechanism for P2P KNN compu-
tation. H&S makes it possible to compute the KNN graph
without requiring users to share their profile information with
anyone else. H&S relies on a simple observation: user-centric
KNN applications such as recommendations do not require
perfect knowledge. To illustrate this fact, Figure 1 depicts
recommendation quality (quality increases towards the top and
the right) with varying level of randomness injected into user
profiles. The plot shows that randomness levels of up to 75%
do not significantly hamper recommendation quality.
Based on this observation H&S trades-off precision in
the computation of similarity for privacy. This allows it to
gain significant protection in terms of privacy with a minimal
impact on applications like recommendation. This makes H&S
a perfect fit for decentralized CF systems.
H&S’s key contribution lies in a novel landmark-based ap-
proximation technique as well as in a fair landmark-generation
protocol. The landmarks of our solution allow two users to
indirectly measure their similarity by comparing their own pro-
files with a set of randomly generated profiles (the landmarks).
The similarity between a user’s profile and a landmark acts
as a coordinate in a coordinate system. Users then exchange
vectors of coordinates and compute an approximation of their
actual similarity. This preserves user privacy as users do not
exchange their full profiles and landmark coordinates only
reveal a limited amount of information about a user.
We present and evaluate H&S using real data traces. We
also demonstrate formally its privacy guarantees by computing
an upper bound on the amount of information leaked by H&S’s
similarity approximation. Our results show that H&S’s KNN
provides a reasonable trade-off between privacy and utility.
H&S disturbs similarity values but it does not significantly
hamper the quality of the resulting recommendations. Ap-
proximate similarity values constitute instead an asset towards
privacy preservation as they effectively prevent adversaries
from performing profile reconstruction attacks as we show in
Section IV.
In the remainder of this paper, we first describe our
system model in Section II before detailing our contribution in
Section III. Then we evaluate H&S experimentally in terms of
recommendation quality, privacy protection, and overhead in
Section IV, and analyze its privacy guarantees in Section V.
Finally, we discuss related work in Section VI and present our
conclusions in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We present H&S in the context of a user-based peer-to-peer
recommender. To this end, we start by describing the operation
of such a system, and highlighting the corresponding privacy
risks. We then present our adversary model in Section II-C.
A. Decentralized User-based Collaborative-Filtering System
We consider a decentralized collaborative-filtering (CF)
system similar to that of [3]. Each user controls a single peer
which stores her full profile as a list of ratings for the items
she has rated. Ratings may consist either of binary values or of
discrete values within a range (e.g. 1 to 5). In the following,
we consider binary ratings as in most existing decentralized
solutions [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [2], [8].
The system uses asynchronous rounds that are executed
periodically by each peer. In each round, each peer attempts
to select a better set of similar other nodes (its neighbors)
according to some similarity metric: for example cosine
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Fig. 2. Gossip-based distributed clustering
similarity [9]. Cosine similarity considers profiles as high-
dimensional vectors in which each unique item is a dimension
and values for each dimension correspond to ratings. It then
evaluates the similarity of two profiles as the cosine of the
angle between the two corresponding vectors.
cos(u1, u2) =
u1 · u2
‖u1‖‖u2‖
(1)
In what follows, we first describe how the neighbors of
a peer are identified in this model (Neighbor identification),
before moving on to the actual mechanism used for to recom-
mend new items to users (Recommendation).
1) Neighbor identification: Peers use two gossip protocols
to identify their KNN: a random-peer sampling (RPS) and
a clustering protocol. The former maintains a continuously
changing topology, while the latter converges to the KNN
graph, as illustrated in Figure 2. Both protocols follow the
same high-level behavior. In each protocol, each peer maintains
a data structure, called view, consisting of a list of references to
other peers: the peer’s current neighbors in the corresponding
protocol. Periodically, a peer p contacts another peer q from
this list and sends it a subset of its own view—half of its
view in the RPS protocol, and its entire view in the clustering
protocol. Upon receiving such a subset, q merges the received
subset with its own view. In the case of RPS, it keeps e random
entries from the union of the two views. In the case of the
clustering protocol, it keeps the e entries whose profiles are
most similar to its own after combining its own clustering view,
its own RPS view and the received clustering view. Then q
replies by sending to p a subset of its view before the update,
and p updates its view analogously. The clustering protocol
provides each peer with a view that converges to its KNN. The
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Fig. 3. Clustering mechanism for convergence to an optimal neighborhood.
In this example, after exchanging their profiles, Alice and Bob modify their
neighbors in order to be connected with the users who share the most their
interests.
RPS provides resilience to churn and partitions and ensure that
the process cannot get stuck into a local minimum.
Figure 3 exemplifies the operation of the clustering proto-
col. Alice and Bob are interested in hearts, though Bob prefers
diamonds. After exchanging their respective list of neighbors,
they keep the users which are closest to their interests. In this
example, Alice replaces Ellie with Carl who likes hearts, and
Bob replaces Alice with Ellie who likes diamonds. After a few
cycles of this protocol, each peer’s neighborhood view contains
the corresponding KNN.
2) Recommendation: Peers use the KNN identified with the
above protocol to recommend items to their users. In typical
systems, each peer identifies the items that were found most
interesting by its KNN and to which the peer has not yet been
exposed. In the case of binary rating, these consist of the items
that were liked by the largest number of KNN and to which
the peer has not been exposed.
B. Privacy Risks
As suggested, the above protocols requires peers to share
their profiles with each other in order to identify their KNN.
This constitutes a major privacy risk: before convergence,
both the RPS and the clustering protocol require peers to
communicate with a large number of other peers, even with
non similar ones. This means that a malicious non-similar
peer can easily copy the profile of a target peer in order to
forcibly enter its clustering view. In the rest of this paper,
we remove this privacy threat by introducing H&S, a novel
similarity mechanism that does not require peers to exchange
their profile information.
Thanks to H&S, peers can identify their KNN without
having to disclose any personal details to other peers. Once
they identified their KNN, they do share their profile infor-
mation with neighbors that are sufficiently stable to compute
recommendations as described in Section II-A2. However, this
does not constitute a significant privacy risk because peers
identified as KNN already know that they have similar profiles.
Learning the details of each other’s profiles therefore does not
add much to this knowledge. Conversely, a malicious peer that
wanted to become a neighbor of a target node would not be
able to clone the corresponding profile without being already
similar to the target peer.
C. Adversary Model
In the rest of this paper, we consider a curious adversary
model. Our adversary can only take a limited set of active
actions to reach her goal, and can otherwise passively gather
information. The goal of the adversary is to discover the profile
of a chosen user (target) by a profile reconstruction attack,
using information obtained during similarity computation. The
adversary only controls one peer, i.e we assume there is no
collusion between adversaries, and our adversary cannot forge
peer identities (no sybil capacity). She also has no a priori
knowledge regarding her target’s interests. The active actions
the adversary can take are: tap unencrypted communications;
attempt to bias multi-party computations; compute her simi-
larity with her target as many times as she want.
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Fig. 4. Overview of the H&S similarity computation mechanism
III. THE HIDE & SHARE LANDMARK-BASED SIMILARITY
We address the privacy issues in decentralized KNN compu-
tation by introducing H&S (Hide & Share), a novel mechanism
for similarity computation. H&S relies on a simple observation:
good recommendations do not require perfect neighborhoods.
H&S therefore relaxes the precision of similarity computation,
by exploiting randomly selected intermediate profiles (land-
marks) with respect to which each peer positions itself. This
allows peers to compute similarity scores they can exploit
without exchanging clear-text profiles.
H&S landmarks take inspiration from reference points in
geo-localization systems. For instance, two-dimensional geo-
graphic locations usually refer to the Equator and the Green-
wich meridian: two landmarks that define their latitude and
longitude. However, our landmarks also exhibit two important
differences with respect to this geographic analogy.
First our landmarks are not fixed and set for the whole
system; rather, each pair of peers randomly generates its
own set of landmarks. This prevents cross-pair comparisons.
Second, we use far fewer landmarks than there are dimensions
in our system. This prevents a precise reverse computation
of each peer’s clear-text coordinates (i.e. its profile) from
its landmark coordinates. Thanks to these differences, users
can safely exchange their landmarks because they do not
characterize their interests in any specific topic.
Figure 4 presents an overview of the operation of H&S
by means of an example. Alice and Bob need to compute
their similarity with each other. In a traditional system like
the one described in Section II, Bob would send his profile
to Alice and Alice would send hers to Bob. Each of them
would then compute the similarity by applying Equation (1).
With H&S, none of this happens. Rather, Alice and Bob
follow these 6 steps. (1) They create a secure communication
channel. (2) They each derive a compact version (Bloom
filter) of his/her profile. (3) They agree on a set of random
landmarks. (4) They each compute the similarity of his/her
compact profile with each landmark. (5) They each gather
these similarity values in a similarity vector. (6) They exchange
each other’s similarity vector and compute their final similarity
estimate. From a practical perspective, this translates into to
two main components: a landmark generation mechanism, and
a similarity estimation protocol. In the following we detail each
of these two contributions.
A. Landmark Generation
H&S uses landmarks to estimate the similarity between two
peers without requiring them to exchange their profiles with
each other. To prevent adversaries from reconstructing profile
information from these landmarks, the landmark generation
mechanism must satisfy a set of requirements.
i Computation confidentiality: Only the two peers participat-
ing in the similarity computation may access the data they
exchange. This includes landmark and similarity values.
ii Independence of peer profiles: Landmarks must be random
and independent of the profiles of the peers that generate
them.
iii Fair landmark generation: The choice of the landmarks
must be fair. Neither of the two participating peers may
bias the generated landmarks.
iv Minimal information release: An attacker should not be
able to reconstruct a target profile by combining informa-
tion from multiple landmark similarities, or by repeatedly
computing its H&S similarity with the target.
In the following, we present our landmark generation
mechanism by focusing on how it addresses each of these
requirements. We detail the various steps in lines 1 through 18
of Algorithm 1.
1) Computation Confidentiality: Requirement (i) states that
third-party peers should not be able to eavesdrop any commu-
nication between peers that are computing their similarity. To
achieve this, H&S encrypts all the communication between two
peers, including that relative to landmark generation.
Specifically, each peer maintains a public/private key pair.
Peers exchange their public keys with each other by attaching
them to the information transferred through the RPS and
clustering protocols, similar to what was is done in [6]. In
addition, we assume that peers may verify the authenticity of
a public key by means of a certification authority or a web of
trust [10], [7].
Peers use their key pairs to establish a secure communica-
tion channel whenever they need to evaluate their similarity.
To this end, they exploit an authenticated key agreement (AK)
protocol [11] as shown in lines 1 and 2. A possible AK
protocol consists of an authenticated variation of the elliptic
curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement such as the one available
in the NaCl cryptographic library [12].
2) Independence of peer profiles: Requirement (ii) states
that landmarks consist of randomly generated profiles that are
independent of the profiles or of the choices of participating
peers. However, as we discussed in Section II, profiles consist
of lists of item-score pairs, where the items belong to an
unbounded or at least very large universe. This would make
it difficult, if not impossible to generate random landmarks.
To circumvent this problem, H&S replaces traditional profiles
with compact profiles (step 2 in Figure 4).
A compact profile consists of a Bloom filter [13] and con-
tains only the items considered as liked by the corresponding
peer. A Bloom filter provides a compact representation of a
set in the form of an array of n bits. To add an item to the
set, the bloom filter applies h hash functions to the item to
obtain h bit positions in the array and sets these positions to
1. To query for the presence of an item, the filter uses the same
hash functions and checks if all the bits at the h indexes have
a value of 1.
Compact profiles carry slightly less information than full
profiles. First, Bloom filters can return false positives even
though they never return false negatives. Second, compact
profiles cannot distinguish between disliked items and items to
which the user has not been exposed. This does not constitute a
problem: the like status of items proves sufficient to describe
the interests of peers, and the effect of false positives may
actually be beneficial in terms of privacy. Compact profiles
also reduce Equation (1) to counting the number of common
bits between the two bloom filters.
Given a user or peer, p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we denote
her compact profile as ~cp ∈ Zn2 . Lines 10 through 18 of
Algorithm 1 show how peers use compact profiles to generate
random landmarks. Let L be a system parameter specifying the
number of landmarks to generate and let PRNG be a pseudo-
random number generator whose code is available to all peers
(for example MRG32k3a [14] or Mersenne Twister [15]). Two
peers, say p1 and p2, may generate a set of landmarks by first
generating a common random seed (lines 10 to 13 in Algo-
rithm 1). Then, each of them saves this seed (line 14), along
with a timestamp, and uses it to initialize the PRNG (line 15).
Finally Each of the two peers independently uses the PRNG
to generate the L landmarks: {Mi} with i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L}
(lines 16-18). Each generated landmark consists of a vector of
bits of the same size as a compact profile, with a few random
bits (around 5%) set to 1, while other bits are set to 0. This
proportion of set bits mimics that of compact profiles, which
are usually sparse.
3) Fair Landmark generation: Requirement (iii) states that
the choice of the landmarks must be fair. To achieve this,
peers agree on their common seed using a bit-commitment
scheme like Blum’s coin-flipping protocol [16]. Blum’s pro-
tocol operates as follows. Both p1 and p2 flip a coin. They
set the output of the protocol to 1 if they obtain the same
result, and to 0 otherwise. To exchange their coin-flip results
without cheating, p1 and p2 employ a bit-commitment scheme.
After flipping its coin, p1 sends p2 a commitment on its result
(f(concatenate(result, nonce))). Then p2 reveals its result
to p1, and p1 reveals its result as well as the nonce it used for
the commitment to p2. p2 cannot cheat because it is the first
to send its result. p1 cannot cheat because p2 can then check
its result against the initial commitment.
Blum’s protocol does not provide an unbiased coin, which
is impossible in the two-party case [17], but a weaker fairness
guarantee that suffices for our application. This guarantee holds
as long as a malicious party does not abort the protocol before
it ends. Since the two peers in our protocol use a secure
channel, if p2 aborts, p1 can deduce that p2 is trying to bias
the result.
4) Minimal information release: Requirement (iv) states
that attackers should not be able to reconstruct a target profile
by combining information from multiple landmarks or by
Algorithm 1 H&S landmark-based similarity computation
protocol between peers p1 and p2, as executed by p1
1: session key ← AK(keyp1, pub keyp2)
2: secure channel← connect(p2, session key)
3: if p2 is known then
4: s← load seed(p2)
5: if s is not older than thL then
6: seed← s
7: goto 15
8: end if
9: end if
10: for all i s.t. 0 ≤ i < 32 do
11: r ← rand bit()
12: seed[i]← coin flip(r, secure channel)
13: end for
14: save seed(p2, seed, timestamp(now))
15: prng ← init prng(seed)
16: for all i s.t. 0 ≤ i < L do
17: ~Mi ← generate lm(prng)
18: end for
19: for all i in 0 ≤ i < L do
20: σp1[i]← cosine(~cp1, ~Mi)
21: end for
22: send(~σp1, secure channel)
23: ~σp2 ← receive(secure channel)
24: similarity ← cosine(~σp1, ~σp2)
25: return similarity
repeatedly computing their similarity with the target. To satisfy
the first part of this requirement, H&S similarity uses a small
number of landmarks with respect to what would be required
to reconstruct the original profile. In Section IV-D, we show
that this does not significantly impact the ability to provide
good recommendations.
To satisfy the second part of this requirement, H&S peers
do not generate new landmarks each time they meet. Rather
they only do so if their latest common set of landmarks is
older than a threshold, thL. To achieve this, they verify the
timestamp associated with their latest saved common seed. If
the timestamp is newer than the threshold, then they reuse the
seed, otherwise they generate a new random seed.
B. Similarity approximation
We conclude the description of our protocol by presenting
how H&S approximates the similarity between two peers using
its randomly generated landmarks. Let {M1, . . . ,ML} be a set
of common landmarks known to peers p1 and p2. First, each
of the two peers independently computes its similarity with
each of these landmarks (step 4 in Figure 4 and lines 19-21
in Algorithm 1). This consists in applying Equation (1) to its
own profile and each of the landmarks. Both p1 and p2 then
store the results of these computations in a similarity vector
(respectively ~σp1 and ~σp2) as shown in step 5 in Figure 4 and
on line 20 in Algorithm 1. Second, p1 and p2 exchange their
similarity vectors with each other. This consists of lines 22
and 23 in Algorithm 1. Finally (step 6 and line 24), p1 and
p2 compute their H&S similarity by applying Equation (1) to
their own similarity vector and to the one they have received
(note that cos( ~A, ~B) = cos( ~B, ~A)).
TABLE I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRACES IN TERMS OF NUMBER
OF USERS, NUMBER OF ITEMS, NUMBER OF RATINGS AND RATING RANGE.
# users # items # ratings Rating range
ML-100k 943 1,682 100,000 [1 : 5] (integers)
ML-1M 6,040 3,900 1,000,000 [1 : 5] (integers)
Jester-1-1 24,983 100 1,810,455 [−10 : 10] (continuous)
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate H&S by applying it in the context of a gossip-
based decentralized recommendation system. Using publicly
available traces, we evaluate the quality of its recommenda-
tions, its ability to protect privacy, and the overhead it implies.
A. Methodology
1) Simulator: We use our own simulator written in Java.
The simulator takes as input a trace from a recommendation
system, consisting of user-item matrix of ratings, split into a
training set and a test set. The training set (80% of the ratings)
allows peer neighborhoods to converge, while the test set (the
remaining 20%) provides the ground truth to evaluate the
relevance of recommendations. The simulator operates in two
steps. First it uses the training set to simulate the convergence
of the clustered overlay, then it generates r recommendations
for each peer using the converged overlay and compares the
results with the ratings in the test set.
2) Datasets: Table I outlines the characteristics of the three
traces we use. ML-100k1 and ML-1M1 are traces from the
MovieLens [18] online movie-recommendation service. They
contain 100,000 and 1,000,000 ratings respectively. Jester-1-
12 is a trace for the Jester [19] online joke-recommendation
service. It is the first third of Jester’s dataset-1.
3) Evaluation metrics: We evaluate recommendation qual-
ity in terms of precision and recall. The former evaluates
whether peers like the recommendations they receive. The
latter evaluates if recommendations cover all the interests
expressed by the ground truth in the test set.
To evaluate H&S’s ability to protect privacy we consider
both neighborhood quality, and a privacy metric. Neighbor-
hood quality evaluates how much the neighborhoods provided
by H&S resemble the optimal neighborhoods, that is those ob-
tained with the standard cosine similarity metric. Specifically,
for each user we measure the average of the cosine similarities
with all the peers in its H&S view, and we normalize it by
the average cosine similarity with the peers in the optimal
neighborhood obtained using an exhaustive search procedure.
Let u be a user with full profile, profileu, and let nu and
Nu be respectively u’s H&S neighborhood and u’s optimal
neighborhood. Then we compute u’s neighborhood quality as
follows.
quality(u) =
1
k
∑
p∈nu cos(profileu, profilep)
1
k
∑
p∈Nu cos(profileu, profilep)
Neighborhood quality provides a first indication of privacy:
lower quality implying better privacy. To obtain a more precise
1MovieLens datasets are available at: http://grouplens.org/datasets/
movielens/
2Jester datasets are available at: http://eigentaste.berkeley.edu/dataset/
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privacy evaluation, we also define set score. This metric
measures the success rate of the adversary in the context of a
profile reconstruction attack. Let G be the set of items that the
adversary guesses as liked by the target, and let P be the set
of items actually liked by the target. We then define set score
as follows, with 4 as the symmetric difference of two sets.
setScore(G,P ) =
|G4P | − |G ∩ P |
|G ∪ P |
A set score of 1 (adversary’s failure) indicates that all the
guessed items are wrong (highest privacy), while a set score
of −1 (adversary’s success) indicates the adversary guessed
exactly the target’s liked items (no privacy).
Finally, we evaluate overhead by comparing the bandwidth
consumption and the storage space required by a H&S-based
recommendation system with those required by a standard
implementation like that of the reference model described in
Section II.
4) Default parameters: The subsequent results correspond
to simulations using neighborhood and RPS view sizes of 10
peers. Compact profile sizes depend on the dataset used: 660
and 1473 bits for ML-100k and ML-1M respectively (roughly
40% of the number of items), and 99 bits for Jester. When
the number of landmarks is not explicitly mentioned, H&S
uses 50 landmarks. This represents a good trade-off between
recommendation quality and privacy. For all the metrics except
set score, we plot values averaged over all the peers.
B. Recommendation quality
We evaluate the quality of recommendations providing by
an H&S-based system using precision and recall [9].
precision(user) =
‖recommendedItems ∩ likedItems‖
‖recommendedItems‖
recall(user) =
‖recommendedItems ∩ likedItems‖
‖likedItems‖
We consider an item as liked when its rating is greater
than or equal to a dataset-dependent threshold (rating ≥ 3
for MovieLens and rating ≥ 0.0 for Jester). Using user-
dependent threshold values such as the average rating, the
median rating, or the half of the rating range for each peer
results in similar or lower precision/recall values. This suggests
that users tend to use the available rating range similarly.
Peers recommend the r most liked item in their neighbor-
hoods, not including those they have already rated. We check
whether a recommended item is liked by looking at the rating
given to this item by the recipient in the test set.
Figures 5 and 6 show precision and recall values for
several values of r. The former shows the results with the
MovieLens datasets, and the latter shows the results with the
Jester dataset. For each dataset, we compare the results of
the H&S-based system (triangle-shaped) with a lower bound
(square-shaped) and a cleartext baseline (circle-shaped). The
lower bound consists of a CF system that uses completely
random neighbors. The baseline consists of the reference
model with full profiles in cleartext, as described in Section II.
The absolute values of recall and precision are quite high
even with random neighborhoods because we do not consider
items for which a user has no rating in the original dataset as
potential recommendations. More generally, absolute values of
precision and recall depend on the predictability and regularity
of the dataset, and their acceptable levels depend on the
application.
Figure 5 shows consistent results by the H&S-based system
across the two MovieLens datasets. H&S provides a reasonable
quality of recommendations: it never suffers from a degrada-
tion of more than 50% with respect to the cleartext baseline.
Moreover the higher the value of r, the closer the quality
remains to that of the cleartext baseline.
Figure 6 shows a similar behavior of the H&S-based system
with the Jester datastet. Recall reaches almost a value of 1
because the dataset only contains 100 items. This characteristic
is also the cause of the maximum precision values being lower
than those of the MovieLens datasets. As the test set does not
contain many items, we consider that a recommended item
without rating in this set is disliked by the recipient, instead
of ignoring it as done otherwise. Although this approach
is pessimistic, it allows us to make a sufficient number of
recommendations.
We showed that H&S preserves the quality of recommen-
dation, being only slightly worse than the cleartext baseline. In
the following, we show that it achieves this while protecting
the privacy of users.
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C. Neighborhood quality
In order to evaluate the extent to which neighborhoods
are different from the optimal neighborhoods, we use the
neighborhood quality measure as defined in Section IV-A3.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of neighborhood quality with
the size of neighborhoods. For each dataset, it compares the
H&S-based system (triangle-shaped) with a CF system using
random neighbors as a lower bound (square-shaped) and a
variant of our system model using compact profiles (star-
shaped). Our reference model from Section II by definition
achieves a neighborhood quality of 1 and compact profiles
provide neighborhoods that are almost identical in the ML
datasets. In the case of Jester, they lower neighborhood quality
by 50% because the Jester dataset contains only a few items.
This makes it more sensitive to the collisions in the Bloom
filters.
H&S similarity has a more significant impact on neighbor-
hood quality than compact profiles. Yet, H&S’s neighborhood
still retain their utility in terms of recommendation as we
showed in Section IV-B. Because landmarks are randomly
generated, some of them might be “far” from the two users
comparing themselves, thus giving little information about
the users’ similarity. Moreover, a set of landmarks is not
necessarily linearly independent. The lower quality of H&S-
generated neighborhoods is in fact an asset in terms of privacy.
Because of this mix of neighbors with various levels of
similarity, the adversary cannot infer her target’s interests just
by looking at her target’s neighbors.
D. Privacy
We evaluate the privacy offered by H&S by running a
profile reconstruction attack against it. This attack consists in
trying to discover the liked items in a targeted peer’s profile
using information obtained during similarity computation. We
quantify the resilience of H&S to such attacks with the set
score defined in Section IV-A3.
The adversary makes her guess in two steps: (1) she tries to
infer her target’s compact profile, then (2) she tries to deduce
the items forming this profile. We consider for (1) that the
adversary uses the closest landmark to her target as her guessed
profile. For (2), we consider that the adversary knows all the
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based system and a system with perturbation-based privacy.
items in the system, so she includes in her guessed set all the
items matching the guessed profile.
We compare our H&S-based system with a perturbation-
based privacy technique. When using this technique, peers
compute their similarity by the usual profile exchange, but
they add random noise to their profile to protect their privacy.
For the sake of comparison, peers implement this technique by
using compact profiles and randomizing a certain percentage
of bits in the profile.
Figure 8 compares our H&S-based system and a recom-
mendation system using randomized compact profiles, in terms
of the trade-off between recommendation quality and privacy.
We use set score for the latter and F1 score, the harmonic mean
of precision and recall, for the former. We obtain different
values of this trade-off by varying the number of landmarks
from 2 to 100 for the H&S system, and by varying the number
of randomized bits in profiles from 5% to 100% for the
perturbation-based system. Set score values are averages over
100 different adversaries and 200 different targets, i.e. 20,000
different sets of landmarks. F1 score values correspond to
r = 30 recommendations.
We observe that the H&S-based system provides an ex-
cellent level of privacy in any case. It also provides a rec-
ommendation quality on par with the best values of the other
system, starting from 25 landmarks. However, the increase in
recommendation quality does not grow as fast as increase in
the number of landmarks.
The recommendation system using randomized compact
profiles preserves an almost optimal recommendation quality
with up to 75% of randomized bits. Although it achieves rea-
sonable privacy (setScore = 0.8 approximately) starting from
50% of randomized bits, it never reaches the privacy levels
offered by the H&S-based system. Even 100% of randomized
bits does not yield a set score of 1 because the attacker tries
to match all item signatures against the randomized profile. In
general, a fully randomized compact profile will contain more
bits with value 1 than a landmark. This will cause the attacker
to identify more potentially matching items.
With these basic strategies for the profile reconstruction
attack, we showed that H&S provides improved privacy to
users without sacrificing recommendation quality, and without
obvious flaws.
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E. Overhead
We evaluate the overhead caused by H&S to peers in terms
of bandwidth consumption and storage space.
Overall, H&S incurs the most part of its overhead when two
peers compute their similarity for the first time because they
have to generate a seed using the bit commitment scheme and
store this seed. So we measure in our simulations the average
number of similarity computations with new peers. The other
parameters influencing H&S’s overhead are the sizes of the
RPS and neighborhood views, and the number of landmarks.
The main factors impacting bandwidth consumption are
the exchange of coordinate vectors and the bit commitment
scheme. The main factor impacting storage space is the need
to store seeds.
Figure 9 compares the H&S-based system (triangle-shaped)
and the reference model (circle-shaped) in terms of the average
bandwidth consumption of a peer per gossip cycle. Bandwidth
consumption of the H&S-based system increases linearly with
the number of landmarks used. It consumes roughly twice to
seven times more bandwidth than the reference model, but the
absolute values remain reasonable (up to 700KiB per cycle).
Moreover, it can probably be improved as a bit commitment
protocol with O(1) bits of communication per committed bit
exists [20].
Figure 10 compares the H&S-based system and the refer-
ence model in terms of the average storage space needed by a
peer. The H&S-based system needs less storage space because
peers only store the seed used to generate landmarks instead
of storing the profiles of peers in their neighborhood and RPS
views as done by standard systems. Still, we observe that the
required storage space is tiny compared to the storage capacity
of modern devices (computers, smartphones, tablets, etc).
1) Computational overhead: We observe that the compu-
tational overhead of H&S is negligible from the point of view
of peers. The most computationally intensive elements of the
H&S similarity are (1) the authenticated key agreement (AK)
protocol, (2) the generation of random bits (bit commitment
scheme and mostly landmark generation), (3) the cosine sim-
ilarity computations with landmarks.
(1) Executing cryptographic primitives incurs negligible
cost on modern devices. It is similar to accessing a website
with HTTPS: the end user does not perceive a difference
between accesses over HTTP and HTTPS. (2) Efficient PRNGs
such as Mersenne Twister can generate millions of bit/second
on modern devices and H&S only needs a few thousands
of bits to generate landmarks during a gossip cycle, which
lasts several seconds at least. (3) Cosine similarity is cheap
to compute on binary vectors such as landmarks and compact
profiles. This confirms the applicability of our approach.
V. PRIVACY GUARANTEE
We now analyze H&S from an information theoretical
viewpoint and compute an upper bound on the amount of
information leaked during our landmark-based similarity com-
putation. We carry out our analysis from the point of view of
an attacking peer, a, that seeks to obtain information about
another peer, p.
During the protocol, a, and p share three pieces of in-
formation: the common seed they agree upon, the landmarks,
{M1, . . . ,ML}, they generate using this seed, and the sim-
ilarity vectors ~σ containing their similarity with respect to
{M1, . . . ,ML}. The first two of these items do not depend
on the profile of p and thus do not disclose any information.
So we concentrate our analysis on the information that ~σp may
leak about the corresponding compact profiles.
A. Conditional Entropy as a Measure of Information Leakage
We start our analysis by obtaining a first expression for
the amount of information leaked by our landmark-based
similarity computation. From the attacker’s perspective, we
define C as the random variable for p’s compact profile,
with realization ~c. Let ~σ be the vector of similarity values
between ~c and each of the landmarks in the landmark matrix.
According to the definition of cosine similarity, we have
σi = cos(~c,Mi) =
~cMi
||~c||·||Mi||∀i ∈ {1, ..L}.
Let us now define an adjusted similarity vector ~v =
{v1, ..., vn}, such that vi = σi · ||Mi||. Then, vi = ~c||~c|| ·Mi.
The goal of an attacker is to guess ~c based on the knowledge
of M and ~σ. But knowledge of M and ~σ implies knowledge
of ~v, while knowledge of ~c||~c|| implies knowledge of ~c because
~c is a binary vector. We can therefore analyze the case of an
attacker that tries to guess ~c||~c|| based on ~v and M .
To this end, we define W as the random variable for p’s
normalized compact profile, with realization ~w = ~c||~c|| . We
also define V as the random variable for the corresponding
adjusted similarity vector with realization ~v, and Mt as the
random variable for the landmark matrix with realization M .
We can then express the uncertainty about W given V
and Mt through the conditional entropy H(W |V,Mt). Such
uncertainty corresponds to the amount of information protected
from the adversary. According to the definition of conditional
entropy, we have:
H(W |V,Mt) =
∑
~w,~v,M
p(~w,~v,M) log
p(~v,M)
p(~w,~v,M)
. (2)
We can then express p(~w,~v,M) as follows.
p(~w,~v,M) = p(~v|~w,M)p(~w,M)
=
{
1 · p(~w,M) if ~v = ~wM
0 if ~v 6= ~wM
(3)
This allows us to rewrite Equation (2).
H(W |V,Mt) =
∑
~w,~v,M, s.t. p(~w,~v,M)6=0
p(~w)p(M) log
p(~v,M)
p(~w)p(M)
=
∑
~w,~v,M, s.t. p(~w,~v,M)6=0
p(~w)p(M) log
p(~v|M)
p(~w)
=
∑
M
p(M)
∑
~w
p(~w)
∑
~v=~wM
log
p(~v|M)
p(~w)
.
(4)
We can split Equation (4) into two parts, using the fact
that log(ab ) = log(a) − log(b). Let H(W |V,Mt) = J + K,
we have
J =
∑
M
p(M)
∑
~w
p(~w)
∑
~v=~wM
log p(~v|M) (5)
K =
∑
M
p(M)
∑
~w
p(~w)
∑
~v=~wM
− log p(~w) (6)
Because there is only one ~v such that ~v = ~wM , we can write
K as
K =
∑
M
p(M) ·
∑
~w
p(~w)(− log p(~w))
= −
∑
~w
p(~w) log p(~w)
= H(W ).
(7)
So we have H(W |V,Mt) = H(W ) + J . The quantity L =
−J represents the amount of leaked information, that is the
amount of information that the adversary, a, can learn about
p’s compact profile. Equation (5) provides a first expression
for this amount of information. In the following, we refine
this expression and present a way to compute an upper bound
for it.
B. Leaked Information and the Landmark Matrix
We now identify a relationship between the amount of
leaked information and the number of non-zero rows in the
landmark matrix, M . We start by taking a closer look at the
term p(~v|M) from Equation (5). We expand it as follows.
p(~v|M) =
∑
~w s.t. p(~v,~w|M)6=0
p(~v, ~w|M)
=
∑
~w s.t. p(~v,~w|M)6=0
p(~v|~w,M)p(~w)
=
∑
~w s.t. p(~v,~w|M)6=0
p(~w)
=
∑
~w s.t. ~v=~wM
p(~w).
(8)
The first line follows from the law of total probability while
the third and fourth result from the same observations on
p(~v|~w,M) as in Equation (3).
To solve the final sum in Equation (8), we define
S(~v,M) = {~c |~v = ~c||~c||M,~c ∈ Z
n
2} as the set of all compact
profiles that have the same adjusted similarity vectors given
a set of landmarks. To evaluate the cardinality of S(~v,M),
we observe that ∀~c ∈ S(~v,M), ||~c|| belongs to one of
the values 0,
√
1, . . . ,
√
n. The worst case w.r.t. information
leakage occurs when all vectors in S(~v,M) have the same
norm
√
wt, wt being the hamming weight of one such vector.
Obviously, ~v ×
√
wt produces an integer vector. Moreover,
~v ×
√
wt must be a sum of some of the non-zero rows of
M , or in other words, a linear combination of the non-zero
rows of M . Then an even worse case occurs when not only
all vectors have one same norm, but also only one such linear
combination exists: in this case, S(~v,M) is smallest.
Let k(~v,M) be the number of 1’s in the coefficients of such
a unique linear combination, and let j(~v,M) = wt− k(~v,M)
be the number of remaining 1’s, those that correspond to zero
rows of M . We can then compute the size of S(~v,M) as(
n−D(M)
j(~v,M)
)
where D(M) is the number of non-zero rows of
M . In the general case, we will therefore have the following
lower bound on |S(~v,M)|.
|S(~v,M)| ≥
(
n−D(M)
j(~w,M)
)
(9)
where with a slight abuse of notation we write j(~w,M) to
mean j(~wM,M). Then, because we assume that all compact
profiles are equally likely (p(~w) = 12n ), we can simplify
Equation (8) into Inequality (10).
p(~v|M) = p(~w)|S(~v,M)| ≥ 1
2n
(
n−D(M)
j(~w,M)
)
(10)
This allows us to compute an upper bound on the amount of
leaked information.
L ≤ −
∑
M
p(M)
∑
~w
1
2n
log
1
2n
(
n−D(M)
j(~w,M)
)
≤
∑
M
p(M)(n− 1
2n
∑
~w
log
(
n−D(M)
j(~w,M)
)
)
= n− 1
2n
∑
M
p(M)
∑
~w
log
(
n−D(M)
j(~w,M)
)
)
(11)
Let us define S(D(M)) =
∑
~w log
(
n−D(M)
j(~w,M)
)
). S(D(M))
sums over all possible ~w and thus depends only on M . Since
0 ≤ k(~w,M) ≤ D(M), S(D(M)) is lowerbounded by
T (D(M)):
T (D(M)) =
n−1∑
wt=D(M)+1
(
n
wt
)
log(min(
(
n−D(M)
wt−D(M)
)
,
(
n−D(M)
wt
)
))
(12)
To further simplify L, let d ∈ [0, nm] be the number of
1’s in the matrix M , and let N(d,D(M)) be the number of
M matrices with d 1’s spread across D(M) non-zero rows.
Finally, let p(Md) be the probability of a matrix with d 1’s.
Then Inequality (13) decomposes the summation in the last
line of Inequality (11) as follows. The outer sum considers all
the matrices with i non-zero rows. The inner sum considers
all the matrices with d 1’s (at least i and no more than im,
m being the number of columns).∑
M
p(M)T (D(M)) ≥
n∑
i=1
im∑
d=i
N(d, i)p(Md)T (i)
=
n∑
i=1
T (i)
im∑
d=i
N(d, i)p(Md)
=
n∑
i=1
T (i)p(D(M) = i)
L ≤ n− 1
2n
∑
D(M)
p(D(M))T (D(M))
(13)
The last two lines follow because
∑im
d=iN(d, i)p(Md) =
p(D(M) = i) is the probability of having a matrix with i
non-zero rows.
C. Upper Bound on Information Leakage
We conclude our analysis by computing the value of the
bound on information leakage in the test configurations of
Section IV. To this end, let η be the probability of an element
in the M matrix’s being 1, and let ~r be a row vector in matrix
M . We can compute the probability of having a non-zero row
vector in M as follows.
ρ1 = p(~r 6= ~0) = 1− (1− η)m (14)
TABLE II. F1 SCORE AND UPPER BOUNDS ON LEAKED INFORMATION
IN THE CONFIGURATIONS OF SECTION IV.
n L F1 score
ML-100k, m = 25 660 660 0.6690
ML-100k, m = 10 660 505 0.6602
ML-100k, m = 7 660 399 0.6567
ML-100k, m = 5 660 338 0.6480
ML-100k, m = 3 660 283 0.6360
This allows us to rewrite Equation (13) to obtain:
L ≤ n− 1
2n
∑
D(M)
(
n
D(M)
)
(ρ1)
D(M)(1−ρ1)n−D(M)T (D(M)).
(15)
For the configuration of Section IV, we obtain η = 0.05.
Depending on the dataset and number of landmarks, this leads
us to the values of F1 score and leaked-information bound
shown in Table II. The results show that 5, and 3 landmarks
allow H&S to provide good similarity scores while leaking
respectively no more than 51% and 43% of the information in
the compact profiles. Also, while the value of L for m = 25
may seem bad, it does not mean that 25 landmarks leak all the
information in the compact profiles, but only that the bound is
not tight.
VI. RELATED WORK
Social networks in general, and collaborative filtering (CF)
in particular, have attracted a number of efforts to propose
decentralized implementations [21], [4], [22], [5], [23]. These
approaches differ in (i) the mechanisms they use to connect
users, and (ii) the level of privacy they provide.
A. Decentralized implicit social networks
Users may be connected through some explicit connections
(as in [23]), which they declare and control (e.g. by “friending”
or following other users, as in traditional centralized social
networks), or through some implicit overlays. PeerSoN [23]
for instance provides an explicit social networks, and relies on
an external DHT infrastructure (e.g. OpenDHT [24]) to store
information and publications related to users, even when users
are disconnected, thus providing temporal uncoupling in users’
communication.
H&S is based on this second type of approaches, which
organize users in an implicit overlay based on their similarity.
This implicit overlay can then be used for item recommenda-
tions [5], query extension [8], search [22], and news propa-
gation [2], [3]. These works exploit the local neighborhoods
constructed around each users to construct recommendations,
or/and route queries and news to nodes and communities
most likely to contain information related to them or have
an interest in them. These approaches construct in practice
distributed KNN graphs [25], [5]. They are therefore closely
related to top-k processing algorithms [26], in particular when
these approaches only exploit local information, thus lending
themselves to decentralized implementations.
B. Privacy protection in peer-to-peer social networks
The means of privacy protection in decentralized social
networks depend on the nature of the connections created
between users. In explicit P2P social networks, i.e. in networks
in which overlay links mirror social relationships, the main
focus lies in the integrity and confidentiality of the peer-to-peer
links. PeerSoN [23] for instance relies on public/private key
pairs to allow each user to control access to her private data.
Safebook [27] extends this approach by relying on a trusted
identification service (TIS), and routing mechanism combining
onion-routing and real-life trusted relationships (matryoshkas)
to hide a user’s node id.
This type of approaches cannot however be directly trans-
posed to implicit overlay networks, in which users (through
their associated node) might interact with many other users
they do not know or trust. One solution is to inject noise in
users’ profiles [28], [29] to distort and thus protect users’ pri-
vate information. Unfortunately, other works have shown that
these scheme are weak and still allow attackers to reconstruct
missing information [30], [31].
[32] provides two-party protocols to compute the cosine
similarity of a document private to one party, with a corpus
of documents private to the other party without revealing any
document to each other. The most efficient of these protocols
uses Paillier’s partially homomorphic cryptosystem to compute
the cosine similarity in a privacy-preserving way. This provides
strong privacy guarantees in the considered security model
which is, unlike H&S, the semi-honest (aka honest but curious)
adversary.
In [33], authors describe a Private Neighbor Collaborative
Filtering (PNCF) algorithm which guarantees differential pri-
vacy of neighborhoods. They also adapt elements of differ-
ential privacy so that the specific requirements of CF are met,
thus retaining utility of recommendations. Although this PNCF
algorithm is designed for the centralized setting, it should be
possible to make a decentralized version.
Private Profile Matching (PPM) [34], [35], [36] and private
set intersection [37] are two related domains of research
which may serve as bricks for decentralized KNN computation.
However, to our knowledge, existing protocols in these do-
mains rely on techniques such as homomorphic encryption that
provide stronger privacy guarantees at the cost of much higher
computational complexity (e.g. [38] reports computation times
of several seconds for a similarity operation between a pair
of users). This makes these solutions impractical for rec-
ommendation systems because distributed KNN computation
requires users to frequently recompute their similarities with a
large number of other users. H&S strikes a different balance
than these approaches and provides an efficient solution with
reasonable privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented Hide & Share (H&S for short), a novel
peer-to-peer similarity computation protocol for decentralized
KNN computation. We have demonstrated both formally and
experimentally that H&S protects the privacy of users in the
context of a peer-to-peer recommender. This protection is
provided while preserving the system’s effectiveness. H&S
introduces landmarks, random data structures that are shared
between peers comparing their profiles. It leverages a com-
binations of cryptography and security mechanisms to ensure
that these landmarks cannot be diverted to attack the privacy
of users.
We have shown using three real-world datasets that H&S
maintains a strong level of privacy while providing recom-
mendations close to that of an open system with no particular
privacy protection mechanism. We have also shown using
preliminary attacks that the Hide & Share mechanism performs
better than a randomization scheme. Finally we have proposed
an upper bound on the amount of information leaked by our
scheme.
Although recommendation has been our primary focus
in this paper, the applicability of H&S is not limited to
recommendation services. In the near future, we would like
to investigate how our proposal might be applicable to other
services, such as search, news propagation, and decentralized
differential privacy. We also plan to improve our upper bound,
and further investigate the properties of H&S under stronger
attack models than those presented here, in particular if we
assume that attackers have some (limited) collusion ability, or
have some prior knowledge of items and users distribution in
the system.
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